The situation in Iraq may seem a muddle, but only when viewed through the lens of expectations. If one views it as a failed military venture that can only produce decay, recent developments will seem unbelievable. If the assumption is that it is a noble expedition wherein a gain in one field means a gain overall, it will seem worthy of general optimism. With either perceptive, perplexity will linger, because neither grasps the simplicity of the situation - that Iraq, like any state or any conflict, has both revolutionary victories and cataclysmic inherent problems.
Here is a clear picture of what may seem mixed results.
The Surge Strategy is beginning to attain its initial aims. The spike in violence that resulted from increased, aggressive contact with the enemy has left their casualties mounting while ours have begun to level off. We effectively secure ground, while still maintaining an aggressive posture against enemy strongholds that the new focus away from Sunni extremists in general has permitted. At the risk of sounding trite or overly simplisitic, it is a fair assessment to say that al-Qaeda in Mesopotamia is “on the run“. This does not mean they cannot retrench. Additional forces are required to truly condemn them to a fate of eradication or effective neutralization. But these forces have been demanded and are being made available - both from the United States and from the Iraqi Army.
Military successes are certain. There remain three significant elements that will continue to plague Iraq, and all three are largely political. One is that Iran and Saudi Arabia continue to flood their “supporters” - read, armed extremists - in the country with arms and manpower. Without this problem staunched, the enemy’s numbers and strength will readily regenerate. The second is that bombings like the one today will continue to inflict mass civilian casualties, ruining any veneer of real security enjoyed by the Iraqis in mixed-ethnic neighborhoods, most notable Baghdad and its environs. This problem, funded by the prior element and facilitated by corruption within the security structure in that area, will be effectively impossible to truly end without cutting off its source. Lastly, Iraqi military forces lack two key components - experienced leaders, depleted by de-Baathification and attrition, and gear, withheld by the federal government’s executive, Maliki.
There is a trend in all of these injurious elements. Namely, that politics is to blame. Convenient as it is to say that the Democrats in Washington are “cutting the forces off at their knees” like Sean Hannity did today, they have not actually blocked any spending on the war. The goods have been slow in getting there, and to the Maliki government’s credit, the Iraqi budget does include defense spending. Nevertheless, Baghdad has been less of a conduit than a clogged funnel.
The sectarian violence of the streets pales in its damning effects to the sectarian will perpetuated in the Iraqi parliament. Those unfortunate enough to be unpopular with the government - notably the Sunni - are starved and deprived, according to the Inspector General of Reconstruction in Iraq.
How long will the American and Iraqi people be forced to endure this de facto tyranny? We must take a fierce look at the Iraqi government’s leadership and bear in mind that the traditional objective in warfare is to deny the enemy its means to fight. In Iraq, that means is born of poverty, fueled by desperate lack, and conducted by local extremists who see a sectarian showdown as the only real means of securing a fair existence. We need to recognize that the source of this problem is the deliberate stalling in government by a sectarian leader with near total power. And we need to demand of ourselves an answer to those who would fill the extremists’ ranks inspired by the question, “what else do we have to hope for but to secure a victory by force?”
Another question that will be far more audible and explicit in the days to come will be, “how long will this go on?” We are only now beginning the month-long recess of the Iraqi parliament. Even after their return, the frustration with no reconciliation legislation or measures being effective pursued by Maliki’s leadership shows no signs of abating. In fact, it is inspiring even legislators of the more extreme opposition to simply give up on the process. Petraeus’ report will not be redemptive or damning to the effort. It will show improvement in the war, but repeat the clear message about the situation given by the new Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, Admiral Mullen, in his confirmation hearings this week: That the critical element is reconciliation and the diplomatic engagement of the countries surrounding Iraq.
So, “how long?” considering all these indicators show no sign of conclusion? Likely for a much longer time yet. And this is both good and worrisome.
It is good because the leading opposition to the war in the US Congress - the Democrats, have shown by deed and by leaked strategizing - that short of total submission to their proposed policy of a legislated withdrawal, they will not forcibly affect a change in strategy. Petraeus’ report cannot deliver a sense of total victory nor a promise of total defeat, and so anti-war Republicans will not be any more induced to simply toe the Democratic line. In short, Congress will do nothing different.
Sadly, it is not Congress who needs to do something different. It is good that they continue funding the war effort, for the military is doing good work. But neither solves the situation. Only the Executive branch’s direction can do that. We critics can grumble about Congressional callousness to the Iraqi plight or poll-driven ambivalence over war support, but we would be complaining about eventualities - Congress does not conduct the war, nor the diplomacy with Baghdad, Tehran and Riyadh. They may keep the ship sailing, and mutter mutinous things, but it is the captain who steers the ship.
And what is the captain doing? President Bush spoke with Maliki, who fed him platitudes about realizing how important reconciliation is. The State Department spoke with Iran, who also agreed on the importance of stability in Iraq. And nothing, forseeably, will happen. Many scoff at diplomacy with Iran out of a notion that Iran’s agenda would keep them an enemy of ours no matter what. Can a similar measure not be applied to Maliki and his Shiite DAWA party?
The course is clear. The military is doing great, but it is merely strengthening the skin of a cancerous body. If the United States does not prescribe some political surgery, and soon, Iraq will just continue to die and scores of men and women, American and Iraqi, will daily die along with it.
The surgery in question should be an irresistable political demand that high-level officials of the United States Executive meet with the key legislators in the Iraqi Parliament and not recess until all critical reconciliation laws are passed and the means to enact them established. Like the Constitutional Convention of the US’ history, the legislators and officials should be forced to remain in each other’s company until all objectives are reached. This need not be done with an “or else” - threats of withdrawing troops or aid need not enter into the situation. When the inner court of the leader of the free world comes to town with uncompromising dialogue, the Parliament will listen. Attendance will be mandatory for the same reasons voting was. And if both sides boycott the talks, the US should reserve the right to dissolve the government it created as fatally flawed.
There is but one authority on earth that can deliver that prescription.
Let us pray for the sake of the sick, desperate and dying that he decides to do so.