General David Petraeus has added another bold act of brilliance to his already storied career - the counter-insurgency training and the secret wars of the Surge Strategy to name two - by endorsing repeal of Don’t Ask, Don’t Tell today.

Shifting from DADT is long overdue - this is not a situation like Integration, where prejudices can be segregated. Gays can and do serve in the military. They are just forced to do so with the indignity of living a lie.

The default attitude of DADT is not security but homophobia. It is far easier to the victim of homophobia ejected by its standard than it is the abuser. There is no reason for this not to change in our enlightened times, save for prejudice, and prejudice has never been a valid reason for the U.S.A.

Unnoticed under the fireworks and fanfare of the election, a significant military development lit up the Middle East desert in a brief, surgically-shaped flash: The United States military attacked Syria.

Official media in Damascus reported earlier that the helicopter-borne troops from Iraq launched an assault on a building site in Al-Sukkiraya village, which lies just eight kilometres (five miles) from the border on the Euphrates river and close to the Iraqi town of Al-Qaim, a stronghold of Al-Qaeda and other insurgents.

Despite the hundreds of civilians who turned out for funereal processions and anti-American chanting the day after the assault, I see this assault into Syria as a good thing. The Global War on Terror demands a certain fluidity when borders are concerned, with one crucial caveat: We can’t use so much force that the nation whose sovereignty we violated actually begins to go into war mode against us. As strapped for cash, grunts and allies as we are, we can’t afford Syria beginning to shift into a massive anti-American paramilitary campaign, let alone slapping down a declaration of capital-W “War.”

But just as war is defined as “diplomacy by other means,” diplomacy is an important instrument of war. And so, just as we have to recognize the permeability of borders in a global war against a non-state actor like Al-Qaeda, we have to recognize that there are too legitimate militaries on either side of each border.

This operation underscores the unilateralism - the go-it-alone approach - of the Bush administration. Duplicitous as they are distrustful, they pour billions of our tax dollars into military aid for nations like Pakistan and Egypt, while using the other hand to slip SpecFor in through the back door for off-the-books strikes like the one on October 27th. This has to change.

Fortunately for America’s future as a military hegemon, we have a powerful change agent: General Petraeus.

…Petraeus proposed visiting Syria shortly after taking over as the top U.S. commander for the Middle East.

The idea was swiftly rejected by Bush administration officials at the White House, State Department and the Pentagon.

Petraeus is, as I’ve mentioned, the Pompey Magnus of our times - a cunning general, as superb in organizing as in personal glory, who realizes that war doesn’t mean an end to the “carrot and stick” approach of diplomacy; just bigger sticks and carrots. He bought off the Big Bad in Iraq - the Sunni militias - and so won them to our side; he out-manuevered the pro-Ayatollah Iraqi regime and swept their Iran-backed security forces out of power; he’s seen to the isolation of al-Q in Iraq.

Now he has his sights set on getting the Syrians on the right team and playing hard for our “big win,” looking to get Syria policing its own borders along with us, rather than against us. And with a man as persistent as Petraeus, there’s hope for the future despite the lock-down of the present Administration.

Petraeus would likely find a more receptive audience for his approach in an Obama administration, given Barack Obama’s views on the need to engage America’s enemies.

So keep those fingers crossed even tighter for an Obama victory three days from now, dear reader. Not only would it mean the views of most prudent economists and strategists will be vindicated, rather than quashed as under a McCain-Palin rule.  It would mean that our best General, our best hope to untangle the gory agonies we trod into overseas, would be listened to rather than used as a showpiece.

I was pleasantly surprised to hear further commentary coming from a leading architect of the new Iraq strategy - a man who seems like a character from one of my novels; a former Australian officer and current counterinsurgency expert know for rough words and deeds, David Kilcullen.

Kilcullen is a clever savage, and was instrumental to constructing Petraeus’ critical counterinsurgency strategy. He has since been hired by the State Department as a top advisor, and his advice is well needed. He gets Iraq; understands its people and understands the obligations of those aiming to occupy their land. This is evidenced in his statement about the idea to invade:

Kilcullen, who helped Petraeus design his 2007 counterinsurgency strategy in Iraq, called the decision to invade Iraq “stupid” — in fact, he said “fucking stupid”

That kind of forthright insight is much needed in a muddle like Middle East nation building. It may just sound vulgar, but that’s not the point - dissembling and distracting has only compounded the problems we face. After nearly a decade of strategic geniuses like Scowcroft, Powell and Baker talking into their sleeve while Rove and his ilk get the masses howling, we find ourselves sunk 100,000 corpses and a trillion dollars down.

Blunt talk is now a matter of survival.

For more of Kilcullen, check out his appearance on Charlie Rose.

I’ve avoided the story of Marines handing out coins with Christian evangelical verse on them, largely out of hoping it’ll blow over, but a significant new development has taken place. Now a prominent leader of the famed “Sunni Awakening” has taken umbrage, stating in no uncertain terms that America could suffer a major backlash if this kind of behavior isn’t quashed, and for good.

“This event did not happen by chance, but it was planned and done intentionally,” [Sheik Abdul-Rahman al-Zubaie, an influential tribal leader in Fallujah] said. “The Sunni population cannot accept and endure such a thing. I might not be able to control people’s reactions if such incidents keep happening.”

We need the Sunni on our side. Before Petraeus breathed new life into talking with our most ardent terrorist enemies - the Sunni militias - and wouldn’t back down from political pressure, the majority of our casualties were being dealt by them. This map of casualties, by province, shows that it was in largely Sunni areas that we suffered worst.

Petraeus’ persistence in talking with the illegal, non-state actors that were responsible for the main part of our losses was revolutionary. It flies in the face of McCain’s babble about “preconditions”; the only precondition in this case was that they were killing more Americans than anyone else and promising to do it until we left. It goes far further than anything Obama’s said, as it wasn’t even talking to another government leader, but to the people who define the term “terrorist.” And it has done wonders for our cause in this war.

The possibility of them turning against us is chilling. With their prodigious influence turned against our enemies, we’ve been able to corner al-Qaeda and isolate the Shia militias, playing them against one another. It isn’t the Surge that’s holding Iraq together. The increased troop presence has allowed us to be effective as an offensive force against al-Q and the Shia. The Sunni were the ones who allowed us to go on the offensive in the first place. This is still the case.

Fortunately, the Sunni want to be on our side. Promise of funding and political power is still real and sweet for them. This incident with the coins - and the other recent controversy of a Marine sniper using the Koran for target practice - are real causes for vexation, but the US military still has plenty of opportunity to correct this kind of behavior.

They have apologized, and they’ve punished. What the Marine did was, of course, against the regulations. What needs to be done now is for commanders to send a clear message to the troops that these kinds of shenanigans are not just illegal, but inexcusably dangerous.

With the command we now have in place - one that has never flinched from what has to be done, no matter how politically unpopular - I am certain that message will be sent.

Obama and Petraeus agree on the key strategic approaches for American forces in the Middle East and Central Asia, indicating the brilliance of both men.

In their coverage of yesterday’s Congressional hearings to confirm General David Petraeus and Lieutenant General Ray Odeirno as CENTCOM Commander and Commander of Iraq forces, respectively, Bergmann and Goldenberg illuminated this key point.

Three similarities were noted, each drawing a definite contrast between their military acumen and the bellicose fumblings blathering from opposition like McCain and the White House:

Foremost, Obama and Petraeus agree that the chief threat to America, both in terms of our ability to project military power to influence our ends and of threats to the nation, lurks in the Afghanistan-Pakistan border regions. It should be elementary that polishing off al-Qaeda and the Taliban, who’ve demonstrated themselves to be willing and effective dangers to the US, is the priority. Obama and Petraeus get that.

Secondly, both favor a strengthening of diplomatic engagement with Iran. While not as pretty a picture for average Americans inculcated with the pabulum of “Good v. Evil” struggles as a WANTED poster with bin Ladin on it, extensive talks with Iran are necessary. We bought the mess that is and always was Iraq - a feisty, factious lodgment against Iranian ambitions, directly on Tehran’s porch. We have to work things out with our neighbors, so long as we don’t have a military presence that can not just deter Iran, but credibly effect regime change.

We don’t have that presence, nor can we gain it without extensive sacrifice by the American people and systemic shifts in our way of life. That means, like it or not, we need to make nice.

The last point is that Odeirno and Obama both see a permanent military presence in Iraq to be disadvantageous. By extension and by reading his writings on counterinsurgency, we find Petraeus agrees with his lieutenant.

Again, this may drop jaws among those that feel that threats must be met with threats in kind. But in the case of Iraq - as with all military ventures - one needs to examine the returns on investment of forces: If we stay hard and heavy in Iraq, we occupy one of the most volatile, resentful populations on some tough terrain. Our presence draws the presence of enemies. If, however, we post troops in local zones capable of projecting power in Iraq if things go south, we retain a formidable power in the region while not standing on the hornet’s nest.

Yet for all Bergmann and Goldberg’s proof of strategic synergy, there is one possible break in the attitudes of Obama and Petraeus: What to do with the troops now?

Both sides beat the drum of their respective superiors. Obama sounds the hue and cry of the American population - a war-weary and confused people who would just as soon walk away from the murderous muddle of Iraq’s sands, cutting their losses. Petraeus has to sound off about how, though there’s no end in sight, there can be hope if we are committed to Iraq.

I will clue you in on a secret, dear reader: Both men are committed to Iraq. Obama does not want to be the second President to preside over helicopters fleeing an embattled embassy. Petraeus doesn’t want an endless string of America’s sons and daughters - his troops - in the sand. Neither wants a disaster.

So it remains to be seen if Obama, when elected, comes to agree with Petraeus - and myself. When he says he will listen to his generals, the crucial point could be that he will recognize that massive troop presence has to continue until the three possible threats to Iraqi sovereignty as it now stands are declawed: The Sunni militias, Sadr’s Shia militias, and al-Qaeda.

That, however, is a matter of how to handle limited resources to manage a disaster neither can speak candidly in public on. More important is that both men agree on what the vision for our overall resources is when facing our foremost contemporary threats.

And most important of all is that they’re right.

In an article entitled “Petraeus promotion ensures future for Bush war plan,” the customarily clever Julian Barnes asserted just that. But if one looks beyond the MoveOn ads and public babble, to the deeds on the field, another view comes clear: The opposite is true.

Barnes has it right in only one regard:

Petraeus has been the prime advocate of Bush’s policy of a large troop presence in Iraq. By naming Petraeus to a job that lasts into the next administration, Bush ensures that the new president will confront the military’s strongest voice for maintaining a big force in Iraq.

This is, however, not because Petraeus is a Bush shill. It is because he is smart. The lesson from the beginning about the Iraq war has been that a massive troop presence has been and will be necessary. If one was to go at all - and it was such a stupid idea that even a victory there would be tantamount to a defeat - one had to go large.

Critics of Bush should be the first to acknowledge this. Bush is known for bottomless defense contract projects to private military companies. He is famed for not having enough troops to protect Iraqis, their natural treasures or their infrastructure, beside the oil ministry. His lack of troops left weapon caches unguarded, neighborhoods vulnerable to ethnic cleansing and our forces outstripped.

That Petraeus knows that he has to correct the basic inadequacy Bush inflicted on our threadbare military presence speaks to his intelligence. Now that we are in that strategic disaster, we need to have at least the minimum of troops necessary to accomplish our limited mission there.

But beyond this accidental similarity, Bush and Petraeus are fiercely divergent. Petraeus is a more devious and determined opponent to Bush’s policies than Moktada al-Sadr. A glance at the past shows this.

Remember how we support the Maliki government? As soon as Petraeus got in, he began raiding the militias that Maliki’s people were using to suck in arms from Iran. Maliki denounced him.

And remember how we don’t talk to terrorists, and are just fighting rogue elements? Petraeus’ arrival saw him cut a deal with Moktada al-Sadr via his Intelligence personnel, in defiance of Maliki and Bush both.

And remember all those contractors? Petraeus’ tenure has seen a shift away from the robber baron corporate handling of Iraq, with more local talent and Armed Forces’ elbow grease. It’s hardly an end to the defense industry bonanza, but he does what he can, and he does it in defiance of the “Bush war plan.”

It’s uncertain how this will pan out, regionally. Petraeus is almost certain to keep his focus on the clearest target America has: Al-Qaeda. That means a shift to Afghanistan. Even Barnes admits Petraeus’ control of “The Other War” means a change from the “Hold on for dear life” strategy we have now:

…as Centcom commander, Petraeus will have plenty of opportunities to inject new ideas into the Afghanistan fight. Petraeus knows how to work with allied commanders, and his reputation will ensure that people listen to his ideas, Crane said.

“This job will give Gen. Petraeus more of a chance to influence what is going on in Afghanistan,” said Crane, a retired Army colonel who helped Petraeus write the Army’s 2006 counterinsurgency field manual.

“If you were someone who thought Afghanistan was in need of a fresh approach, you should be excited about Gen. Petraeus’ appointment.”

Along with Afghanistan’s warring tribes and opium-dependent economy, Petraeus will inherit the problems of al-Qaeda’s actual core, Pakistan, and its brain and bloodstream, Saudi Arabia.

He will also be given power over the realm of the pirates off the enormous Horn of Africa, who this week struck twice again to seize hostages for ransom.

And, lastly and yet most significantly for the strategic direction of the US in the region, he will be given watch over the two nuclear aspirants in the Middle East - Syria and Iran. Balancing belligerence to counter actual belligerence from both nations, in Lebanon and Iraq respectively, will be a delicate act. It will surely win him little favor with the anti-war set, as Petraeus will not permit Iranian meddling in Iraq. But so long as there are opportunities for peace, as well as war, to exploit, Petraeus has shown himself canny to detect and seize on them. Syria’s proposal of a lasting peace agreement with Israel, centered around an exchange of control over the Golan Heights, could be such a promise.

Syria has said it will wait for a new administration to take power in the USA before actual talks with Israel begin. Just like with the missions in the various nations Petraeus takes over, so much depends on a new commander-in-chief in Washington.

Yet this much is certan: To look at Petraeus’ actual record is not to see a commander dedicated to a failed war policy. It is a portait of someone, like many Americans, who has simply been doing his level best to clean up the messes of the administration. It is not the promise of a continuation, but of change we can believe in.

The most significant military genius of our times has been appointed to the most significant command in the world, as Army General David Petraeus was picked today by the President to head up CENTCOM. This is more than just a change of the brass on the shelf. This is the beginning of a new era of American war fighting in the toughest region of the world.

Petraeus is a figure of change because he is our American Pompey. Pompey was the Roman general who used a surge of resources and political will to win a tough war in the 60s BC not only by fighting better, but by winning the peace.

Pompey brought down an epidemic of piracy in the Mediterranean that made al-Qaeda look like the Falun Gong; his keys to victory were a phenomenal aptitude for organizing despite lean forces and a willingness to exercise amnesty over violence.

Petraeus has introduced the same to the American war in Iraq: He had to struggle as hard against a threadbare and mercenary Pentagon to get his Division, the 101st, into place in Iraq for the invasion as he did against Saddam’s forces, a conflict well recorded by Rick Atkinson’s “In The Company of Soldiers.”

Petraeus then took a page from Pompey’s book when, as Commander of Coalition Forces in Iraq, he masterminded and executed the “Sunni Uprising” - or, as it could objectively be called, the bribery and persuasion of our chief insurgent enemy to switch sides. Just like Pompey’s follow-up to the pirate campaign found him marching against the Greek King, Mithridates, buying off bandits and persuading towns to fly Rome’s banner in exchange for political agency, Petraeus offered the same to the Sunni provincial leaders. Often this demanded he undercut the Iraqi government in Baghdad, and even fly in the face of stated Bush administration policy.

In fact, if Petraeus, like his predecessors, had complied with Bush’s oath that we “do not negotiate with terrorists” and refused to recognize the militias as the dominant political forces on the ground, we would not have any measure of what success we have today. He cut deals with local leaders, feeding them funds long stymied by the corrupt Maliki regime set on starving them out. He worked out a backroom cease fire with Moktada al-Sadr, in direct defiance of Maliki. This has led to an unparalleled amount of public works in Iraq that actually stick. And, most importantly to the American military enterprise against its dogged enemies, it has allowed him to systematically focus on those opposed to our interests - first, al-Qaeda, and now, al-Sadr.

So what will Petraeus bring to the total command over Africa and the Middle East that comes from CENTCOM leadership? The same ingenuity and defiant dedication to success that Pompey brought to his total command of forces in the same region:

He will opportunistically circumvent stale, stubborn administration policies preventing him from talking to our enemies. He will focus on the core objective of counter-insurgency - eliminating the public support for the bandits - by whatever means necessary, including armistices and foreign aid. And he will continue to show a brilliance for organization - for making do with little and retaining the initiative against an adversary that is, by definition, unpredictable.

Pompey’s adventures were cunning above all else, and never let the stupidity of his government obscure his mission. His actions led to an era of domination that was the foundation of the future “Pax Romana” - the Roman epoch of prosperity, influence and military supremacy.

Petraeus, our Pompey, has the cards stacked against him too: A callow political leadership, a redoubtable enemy and awful terrain.

From what he has shown so far, his achievements will be no less legendary.