Recent accounts of the now-infamous Blackwater activities during the opening weeks of September were compiled by the McClatchy news service yesterday. Not to sound blase’, but they’re not unfamiliar to Blackwater’s record. In Afghanistan and in Iraq, they and other Private Military Contractors have been involved in numerous outrages. Many apparently - according to our soldiers and the locals - go unreported.

Here is a video that did get reported - involving contractors protecting a convoy by shooting any car that came near.

The images may seem innocuous enough but, put into the words of a report of similar activities during the week of 9.11.07, their effects are more visceral:

Iraqi officials said the guards were unprovoked when they opened fire on a white car carrying three people, including a baby. All died. The security guards then fired at other nearby vehicles, including a minibus loaded with passengers, killing a mother of eight. An Iraqi soldier also died.

Why this is allowed to happen is because no law whatsoever binds Blackwater USA and other PMCs. What they do in Iraq doesn’t bring US law down on them. However, they are also not bound by Iraqi law. Thus they operate in a legal limbo. Proof of this is evident by the fact that Baghdad’s government revoking their license to operate had absolutely no effect.

Really, the only censure they might fear is embarassing the company. That is not particularly easy to do. I would posit that the reason we heard of the attacks that killed around a dozen people was because they took place right in front of a government building.

But as for the Iraqis, these kinds of incidents do not go unknown. Sadly, I should expect that your average Iraqi cannot tell the difference between an unregulated private employee and a scrupulously-regulated American soldier. Consequently, it inspires a general outrage that knows little to no discrimination for the sake of fairness.

The Iraqis will “remember 9/11″ in a very different sense indeed. Different attacker; similar rage. If only it was only a single day that they had to endure the terror of living under mercenary gun barrels. And if only we had another solution but to hire those guns.

Russert is a fine interviewer - as close to a two-fisted interviewer as they come in the mainstream. He met the Dems in Dartmouth, and the results are reviewed live here.

How To Leave Iraq?

Russert’s first question was put to Obama, asking him how he’d redeploy the troops if troop levels remained in line with the Bush administration’s predictions. Obama gave a detailed answer as to how he’d deploy, beyond stating that his strategy involved an immediate drawdown and the placing of precedence on counter-terrorism and training activities, rather than broad security. I have the doubts about the tactical efficiency of this, as I’ve always felt so much of the ill in Iraq is due to too few troops.

I don’t have doubts about his strategic integrity though, as, when Russert asked directly, Obama said he may keep troops in Iraq into his second term. That’s the kind of determination anyone could respect.

Hillary, on the other hand, merely said she agreed with Obama that it was hard to predict the future, and didn’t go beyond that. I think Obama did a fine job of showing how one /can/ speak to the future without issuing impossible promises. In any event, she goes on to blame Bush and then closes by swearing to begin drawing down troops the moment she’s sworn in.

Edwards talks about even deeper cuts. He criticizes any “combat missions” - proposed by Clinton, in the context of counter-terrorism, prior to the debate - and notes he’d want only about a brigade of troops, 3,500, to protect the embassy. That would make the island sanctuary of the Green Zone smaller and nuttier than Gilligan’s Island. A brigade couldn’t secure us against that country’s collapse any more than the New Orleans levees could stand against Katrina. It’s simple numbers.

As for Edwards balancing the lack of troops with some awesome diplomacy that sways Iran and Saudi Arabia to not use that weakness to their advantage, well, I have little hope for his folksy populism winning over those ruthless realists.

Magic Carpet Ride

Russert then swivels the spotlight onto Richardson, and demands to know how he’d yank the troops out in less than six months without using the mystical secrets of the Orient. Richardson blabs about how the other Dems aren’t prioritizing it. Russert keeps on him, demanding to know how he’d bend the laws of physics.

It’s then that Russert admits that he’d have to leave some “light equipment” behind and would need to persuade Turkey to let our troops through. How driving through the Roman roads of Eastern Turkey would speed things up much, I don’t know, and I doubt Turkey would allow it gladly. More importantly, “light equipment” includes little things like assault weaponry, explosive ammunition and technology. A similar withdrawal - from Lebanon in the eighties - almost singlehandedly created the modern small arms market. What Richardson proposes would be a slow-motion Hiroshima for the world’s bush wars.

Biden talks of Obama’s attitude in principle. Dodd does the same with Richardson’s plan. I nod to one fellow and shake my head at the other. Biden also mentions that his plan won some 75 Senate votes, which is no mean sum and smells Veto proof. I’ll be running a follow-up article to see if it’s so.

Kucinich, when asked, talks a good game of enhancing peace, but I’m still not sold that sprinkling cash and goodwill on that country is going to do other than be sugaring a seething cauldron.

So far, the Dems, when pressed, have been forced to admit, “Yes, we may have to be in there in a big way five years down the line and without end.” The best of them - the only ones worth it - have a plan.

The Reps haven’t been pressed. And to a man, their plan is, “Just win.”

That’s not a plan. It’s not even victory at any cost. That’s a formula for disaster at any cost.

Speaking of which, Gravel mentions that the Congress is complicit in continuing the war, and seems to - at most - be simply using it as a chance to score political “anti-Bush” points. At least - and he cites legislation condemning Iran - it’s facilitating a hostile and destabilizing agenda.

Dodd is asked if actually blocking any spending is practical. Dodd suggests it isn’t, but says you can at least chasten the administration. He may as well have just said, “Really, we’re powerless … Vote for us!”

Those Damned Hypotheticals

Hillary is then asked a very direct question about principles. “Would the Israelis be justified if they bomb an Iranian nuclear site if they feel threatened?”

She dismisses it as a “hypothetical”. Russert insists it isn’t. She insists it is and then begins to try to mention the recent IDF bombing run into Syria and blame Bush in the process. He steers it back to her. She dodges. He says what Rudy directly said. She dodges again, and that closes it down.

Obama is asked. He says that diplomatic solutions are his emphasis, and lists a few - namely, the tactics of economic sanctions. Russert presses in, demanding to know whether he’ll promise the American people - like Rudy did - that there will be no Nuclear Iran. Obama says that the US under his watch will do “whatever is necessary.”

Good enough in a pinch. But it makes it very clear that no one wants to say flat out that they’ll bomb Iran.

Funny that they don’t, considering how big a hit McCain’s “Bomb Iran” song was.

Edwards is called on, and meanders off on a discourse about bad intelligence. He steers it back to a place near where Clinton was, which is nowhere near an answer. Russert moves on, likely realizing Edwards may as well be responding in Martian so far as hopes for an intelligible direct response are concerned.

Richardson, however, says, “Yes,” promising both a non-nuclear Iran /and/ a strong Israel. He says that international support’s been lacking in the past, and cites that he wants to talk to the moderates in Iran. That’s a nice idea, but if the Mullahs feel their moderates are being subverted, they’ll shut them down. I’m both dubious of his strategy and aware that, were it to work, it would be a delicate thing.

From that point on, Richardson refuses to say explicitly that he’d back an Israeli missile strike on Iran. We move along from then, skating onwards atop the sheen of sweat left by the candidates on the floor - all of whom just saw headlines flash before their eyes that cast them as the second coming of Barry Goldwater, or an anti-Semitic spaghetti-spined sellout.

Sanctuary Cities

The question is “are sanctuary cities kosher with you?”

Richardson essentially says, “Sure, and we need more funding to manage immigration.” He proposes giving precedence of legimitizing illegals before those “waiting in line” to become citizens. The question doesn’t stick.

It does stick to Biden, who notes that the INS needs more cash to do anything - that it’s even underfunded, let alone too small for the managing task asked of it. He then says, no, harboring illegals isn’t alright.

Dodd suggests immigration law reform first and foremost.

At this point, keeping things lively, Russert begins moving down the line and tapping each candidate pointblank in the dome with the question about sanctuary cities.

Not a one is going to answer. Obama too cites reforming immigration law and giving the INS more money for enforcement, but he ducks the question same as Dodd did. Hillary at least says, “there’s no choice” but for sanctuary cities to ignore the federal law. She notes the genuine concern that otherwise, illegal immigrants and any of their cohorts will refuse to speak with the police.

Gravel says he’s ashamed that the country’s keeping people out. Eh, whatever. Considering the condition of Mexico, open borders would be tantamount to open invitation, and with open voting as well, we’d not be far from reparations for the war of 1846. Viva Santa Ana.

Bush Sees All, Knows All

Russert’s next question is to give the candidates some breathing room, surely. He asks how Bush’s prognostications about Hillary clinching the nomination sit with them. I’ll be using this time to kick back and watch where this fluff piece flits.

Hillary gets an open mike for her position on health care. Most of it is a back and forth about the merits of her future plan compared to that of her former plan.

One thing worthwhile she mentions is that all the predictions adversaries of her past plan made as to what her plan would do, came about any way under the deregulated HMOs and private companies of the 90s. The disaster came about not because we adopted her plan, but because we didn’t. Maybe it would’ve been worse, but considering factors like the recent battle between the UAW and General Motors - in which GM had to pay through the nose for health care that its competitors don’t have to worry about, thanks to government-run care - it’s hard to imagine we need less, not more, government involvement in health.

Edwards plays the “born again health care candidate” card, after Russert notes that he’d dogged on it previously, even in ‘04. He does, however, seem ardent about it, and his plan has numbers. That’s more than most can say.

When it comes to Obama, the question’s not about health care. It’s about his experience. “Why,” Russert asks, “if 04 wasn’t the right time, is now the right time?”

He talks about how, right now, the country needs a leader like him. He in essence describes himself as a uniter. I could not agree more that is what’s needed, and that he measures up.

The Russert juggernaut rolls on.

He roasts Gravel for going bankrupt twice. Gravel somehow ties his 90K of debt being stuck to the credit card companies with an initiative to empower voters. I’m not buying it.

Kucinich’s Cleveland Mayorship - less than awesome, save that he was nearly killed by the mob and stuck to his principles, but unpopular all the same - is brought up. Dennis doesn’t even mention the mob hit. He does, however, say that people liked him battling for what he was elected on. That much is true. They just didn’t like the rest of him; at least not enough to bring him back to Cleveland’s city hall. They sent him on to the nation’s “city hall” instead, sixteen years or so later.

Richardson’s less-than-shining domestic liberal cred is challenged. Not surprisingly, he talks about his diplomatic experience.

The King And King

The candidates are asked if they would want their kids to be read, in second grade, a story about a prince marrying another prince.

Edwards says he’s all for it, and for getting rid of DOMA.

Obama says the same, and suggests it’s key to not feed people’s fears of each other.

Clinton takes it a step further, noting that feeding fears was critical to the last two Presidential electoral successes, and agreeing with the previous position.

Things move on after an entirely predictable 6 minutes.

Social Security Insecurity

Russert’s question is - “Will you adjust the Social Security qualifications or taxes?”

Biden is the first to be asked. He says, yes, he’d do something, and between cutting benefits or raising taxes, he’d go for raising the income cap for the taxes.

Hillary says that it’s all about balancing the budget. The heck it is. She also says bipartisan compromise and Presidential leadership is necessary. She says that before these things are implemented, /everything/ is off the table. No options.

Russert presses her on it. She says, again, “nope - nothing is on the table.” Guess we’ll have to wait until she’s out of office to get any proposals.

Obama takes the other tact - that everything is on the table, and he’ll get people together to sort it out.

Dodd says everybody’s getting too extreme about raising the cap, but says that’s the way to go.

Richardson talks about growing out of it, and just not spending so much that we need to raid Social Security. Even if his scheme to do this was based on selling all that “light equipment” in Iraq, he wouldn’t be able to pull that off. He calls 1.3% economic growth “pathetic” and claims he can make that up, and thereby finance Social Security. That’s a tall claim. Considering how he goes about planning for his other tall claim - getting the troops out of Iraq - I’m suspicious.

Edwards backs the idea of boosting the cap, but adjusting it such that the middle class is the group that’s capped - not the very wealthy. His range seems pretty narrow, but, indeed, we could use a stronger middle class.

Hillary finishes this round by again expressing the importance of fiscal responsibility. I feel it’s a distraction; fiscal responsibility only goes so far, especially when the debt is actually more good than harm in some ways, globally. Then she notes that the Democratic administrations have been better budget stewards than the GOP. This, I’m sad to admit, has been true since Carter passed over the reins.

But when she claims that she has “said where she stands” and what she’ll do about fixing social security - not just setting the table for the parties to sit down and discuss how to do it, but her ideas for doing it - I have to call foul. She spent a lot of time tonight explaining just how she /wasn’t/ going to say any such thing.

Banning Butts

The question is, “Would you support a national law to ban smoking?”

Hillary says that she isn’t, “at this point.”

Obama says “the local laws” should “play themselves out,” and are making great strides. He prefers the local.

Everybody else favors a national ban.

Keggy Loves You

The next question is, “Would you let the States decide the drinking age?”

The people of Dartmouth, where the debate is held and where their school mascot is “Keggy the Kegstand”, cheers.

Biden says that alcohol exacts a stiff health cost from this country - deformed babies, alcohol-related illness and crimes - and letting more people have better access to alcohol isn’t going to help that.

Dodd agrees. Richardson does too. They both float various ideas about rehab, education and law enforcement.

Only Gravel and Kucinich are all for lowering the drinking age - Gravel for a reason ripped from the pages of “Sgt. Rock” comics: Anyone old enough to fight should be old enough to drink. However, since it doesn’t naturally follow that not everybody old enough to fight will, but that plenty of people old enough to drink will, regardless of how they feel about serving their country, this is not so winning a rationale.

Kucinich makes the good point that leading kids by example through responsible drinking is better than telling them - and I quote - “thou shalt not” (an accidental Biblical double-negative, but whatever). This is true, but lowering the drinking age will not turn parents into examples of responsible drinking. It’ll just increase access to booze for the responsible and irresponsible alike. This means nothing more than a slight increase in alcohol related ills - certain disease and accidents - and gains - “Girls Gone Wild Videos”? I’m not sure.

And here we have Dennis Kucinich’s central flaw: He expects everybody is, at heart, Dennis Kucinich. And I don’t want to sound like Hobbes here - after all, I do believe in leading by example. But to make a stark generalization to poke a hole in Kucinich’s central spiritual thesis, there are actually two kinds of people in this world: Those who are or could strive to be as decent as Dennis, and those who will beat those people up and take their lunch money.

Lightning Round

Obama’s asked if “turning the page” means getting past the Bushes, Clintons or both. He says he means getting away from divisiveness, special interests and deceptions.

Clinton is asked whether the fact that 40% of Americans only knew a White House with a Bush or a Clinton in it is a good thing. She says Bill was a great President. As for me, I found that notion chilling. And yet, I liked Bush I and Clinton I. They’re not to blame.

It just goes to show - sequels always suck.

Biden’s asked if MoveOn.org has changed politics for the better. He says he doesn’t think they’ve changed politics. I agree. He says they’ve done some good things. Again, in agreement. And he indicates that they don’t “own” the party, contrary to a hubristic comment by their executive director, Eli Pariser. I’m still nodding. For honestly, MoveOn is not “the process”, it’s just part of it. And like any broad action committee with good intentions, it tried things both positive and negative.

At this point, the lightning round becomes a blur. Gravel, Kucinich and Edwards are asked questions. They get laughs.

Then we get to Obama’s excuse that he didn’t go to Jena and intervene in the racially divisive events there because he was busy trying to mitigate Iraq. My thoughts on Jena will be coming soon, but suffice it to say that anything - even “I had to be in Washington in order to not vote at all on the bill condemning MoveOn.org” - would have been fine by me.

On nuclear power, Edwards says “no go”, flat out. Obama says it’s an option. Kucinich says green energy alone can do it. Gravel thinks wind will be sufficient. Clinton’s with Obama - that nothing’s off the table.

Then comes a nutty question asking whether, if we had the number three guy in al-Q, he knew a bomb was going off somewhere and we knew it, the candidate would have him tortured for the information.

Obama says you just don’t sanction torture. Biden says the same. Clinton says the same.

But Bill doesn’t! It comes out that Bill had cooked up that zany scenario. Clinton is then demanded to say where she differs from Bill. She doesn’t specify.

I’m still wondering how, if we’re so certain about the bomb that we’re going to torture this guy, we haven’t found it already.

In any event, everybody agrees that you don’t abridge freedoms and torture and so on and so forth. Of course, most acts of war are in violation of these very principles, but the first three candidates were right - you can’t sanction that kind of truth.

Also, torture really /is/ unreliable. And when you use it as a policy, it does particularly dark things to your personnel and appearance. So it’s best to keep off the books.

From torture, to money - the next question is about whether Presidential Libraries should make public their dues. This one keeps many Americans up at night, surely. Everybody’s all for transparency, in a vague way.

Edwards is asked if he spends too much money on stuff. He says he started poor, and worked until he was rich. He’s right, and that’s all very nice for him. I think we should stop bothering rich people about their frivolities and expenses, and begin taxing them more. That will satisfy people’s hatred of “The Man” and feed the kitty.

Next, “What’s Your Favorite Bible Passage?”

Obama goes for “Sermon on the Mount”. Always a classic - the “Stairway to Heaven” of responses to this question. Empathy is the core of it, and Obama says he wants to restore.

Clinton - “the golden rule”. Gravel doesn’t really have one. Dennis has a quote from St. Francis, which is close - “Lord, make me an instrument of your peace”. Richardson goes for the Sermon on the Mount too. And Dodd for “the good Samaritan”. Edwards opts for “that which you do to the least of us, you do to me.” A fine notion, but nothing you want to govern by.

Biden goes for “the warning of the Pharisees.” Nice. Hardcore, Joe.

Then comes “Yankees or Red Sox”. And me, I’m a football fan, and I’m running late for Sloppy Joes and college ball. This post is over.

Iranian President Ahmadinejad arrived in New York City yesterday for a visit that, by all apparent intentions, was a mission of outreach and peace. In response, America by and large only extended its defining freedom of expression to him so far as it allowed him to be berated and humiliated. Was this a fitting response to, as the President of the University that invited Ahmadinejad to speak, Lee Bollinger characterized him, “a petty and cruel dictator“?

Many, throughout the political spectrum in America, would argue that it was. Ahmadinejad, after all, is by no means a progressive leader of his people. Under his watch, the Iranian police have cracked down on “morality” related offenses - violations of fundamentalist Islamic practice. Freedoms of expression and action have been curtailed. And he is, by all indications, waging a proxy war against us that now constitutes the majority of our casualties in Iraq. So why not roast him?

It is not regardless of these reasons, but because of them, that America’s reaction to Iran’s President was not only wrong, but shamefully wrong.

First, there is the matter of integrity. America holds many of its values sacred and essential to its character, but none so highly as the first entry on its Bill of Rights - the freedom of speech. That is a principle we support throughout the globe - most of the time - and rightly defend at home. But doing things like refusing Ahmadinejad’s overtures to plant a wreath at the WTC attack site or saying that he should not be allowed to speak at Columbia is an assault on that notion of free expression - on the notion that only by acceptance of diversity of views can we achieve a true acceptance of humanity. Nevertheless, that is precisely the face we showed the world, left and right wing, when he arrived.

We were, in essence, demonstrating that our values are only as strong as the latest outside pressure on us - the latest hype, the latest conflict. We support free speech up until when it’s inconvenient or offensive. Then we, like any powerful nation feeling stung or endangered, recoil and shut down from the objectionable idea.

We’re better than that. Furthermore, we need to be able to act in keeping with a better future in order to create a better future.

This is the second reason that flatly denying Ahmadinejad’s efforts to extend his gestures of compassion and his views to the US, or even using that extension as an opportunity to insult him, was tragically wrong. The old adage that you cannot choose your enemies only goes so far. By and large, you do choose your enemies, by acting better than the sorry circumstances of conflict that you’ve been drawn into with them. Until you act in peace and friendship, you cannot enable peace and friendship.

This is not to say we should not be on the offensive against Iran’s incursions in Iraq, should not curtail their nuclear program aggressively until they allow for more thorough inspections and should not maintain diplomatic pressure for human rights’ sake. I have always been in favor of those activities of late. It is, instead, to recognize that if you act hostile to someone, it gives them cause for hostility; if you act in friendly communication, it gives cause for friendly communication. You don’t have to be Christ-like in all that you do. A meek America may not inherit the earth. But when someone extends a hand, slapping it away or spitting on it inspires a certain acrimony. If we don’t realize that Iran’s President and many Iranians won’t see it that way, then we’re assuming that Ahmadinejad is the one who’s Christ-like, constantly turning cheeks until he submits entirely.

That’s a pretty crazy assumption, though he has consistently made efforts towards peace and communication. Most notably, he sent an eighteen-page open letter to Bush, expressing his views on the relations between the US and Iran. Some of those views were offensive to the common American perception of its nation, but should we have expected any less? It seems more remarkable that many were not.

Many people dismiss both the recent visit and the open letter as merely political ploys. That could indeed have been Ahmadinejad’s motives. But if we dismiss them as political ploys, we dismiss any potential for making something more of them. We have to keep in mind that at the same time President Reagan was denouncing the USSR as the evil empire, fighting proxy wars against them and amassing a prodigious nuclear stockpile directly against them, he was doing all he could to visit with Soviet nations and Soviet leaders in order to cultivate friendly dialogue. Why are we not receptive to efforts to do the same from Iran?

Are we simply so confident that things must go towards war?

If not, we are going to have to be brave enough to reach out and take an enemy’s extended hand for the sake of peace. We have to voice our own views - not in a hostile manner like the “jeering” crowd at Columbia, that insulted a foreign power’s president for ten solid minutes before he even spoke, but in a confident and positive way. We will, in essence, have to be better than our enemies.

I like to think we can.

As an update on the edgey events in the broader Middle East, it has come out that Israel really was after nuclear materials in Syria. September 6th was a busy day for Israel, who both flew a raid over Syrian airspace with a live munition drop on the Syrian border /and/ dispatched commandos that destroyed a North Korean-fostered Syrian nuclear facility. This once again proves that Israel is at the top of their game for multi-tasking regional conflicts.

According to “high level sources”, the raid was a less-than-tidy affair:

Diplomats in North Korea and China believe a number of North Koreans were killed in the strike, based on reports reaching Asian governments about conversations between Chinese and North Korean officials.

This likely means a significant setback for Syria’s plutonium-related plans; President Assad will have to wait on taking out that reverse mortgage on the Golan Heights. And this is an unqualified good thing, as Syria - like North Korea but unlike Iran - is truly an unstable state ruled by a crackpot junta that has far too many terrorist irons in the global fire to do itself any good. Syria has a much better chance of getting its act together than North Korea, but it is still a long way from being a responsible regional leader.

At this point, it is becoming increasingly evident that the broader Middle East - Iran to Israel - is gearing up for war. Every major party is flashing their guns and talking loud. And with the situation in Iraq continuing to circle the drain - thanks in no small part to Iran’s intervention there - the value to the West of winning back some strategic cred by putting a thermobaric boot to Iran’s nuclear program is climbing.

It has been an interesting waltz to say the least. While it had been fomenting for awhile, tracking the events of this September alone shows how each side is using the actions of the other to escalate, all the while speaking as though they want only peace.

The month began with an ill-timed olive branch - a gesture by the ailing Ahmadinajad government to suggest it isn’t the vitriolic monstrosity that the West and its own inflammatory rhetoric has suggested it to be: They announced the opening of a Jewish center in Tehran. As with Bush’s AIDS relief entitlement, nobody abroad really noticed this sign of compassion, and most of those that did considered it fake. Multi-culti Mullahs are hard to swallow, I admit. Then again, we create the future we decide to believe in.

Keeping that same principle in mind, it was vocally announced that the Pentagon had drafted up a warplan to comprehensively annihilate Iran’s major military installations in a “three day blitz.” The plan itself isn’t nearly as significant as the announcement of it. We draw up plans to powderize our adversaries quite often. Rarely do we make sure everyone in the world knows. And, as with the build-up to war with Iraq, we heard from a familiar cast of characters:

First, the IAEA, whose measured and conservative reports of improvement seem just tailored to offend the five-minute-news, shock-scare-drunk sensibilities of American audiences:

The International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) last week reported “significant” cooperation with Iran over its nuclear programme and said that uranium enrichment had slowed. Tehran has promised to answer most questions from the agency by November, but Washington fears it is stalling to prevent further sanctions. Iran continues to maintain it is merely developing civilian nuclear power

And from the Achmed Chalabi du jour: “Resistance fighters” who, though they have likely not been back to their country since cellphones weighted eight pounds, claim their intelligence is most accurate:

Alireza Jafarzadeh, a spokesman for the National Council of Resistance of Iran, which uncovered the existence of Iran’s uranium enrichment plant at Natanz, said the IAEA was being strung along. “A number of nuclear sites have not even been visited by the IAEA,” he said. “They’re giving a clean bill of health to a regime that is known to have practised deception.”

What isn’t mentioned is that these sleuths-in-exile are listed by us as a Foreign Terrorist Organization - an inconvenient classification when you’re using them as a public justification for possible military action.

Iran’s response was to announce that they’re not the only ones with WMD in the region, pointing their finger squarely at Israel.

He indicated that countries like Syria, Lebanon and Egypt have been reluctant to join the Organisation of the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons (OPCW) mainly due to the Israeli stance. Israel has signed the Chemical Weapons Convention but has not ratified it yet.

Again, this attitude may sound like more Zionist-bashing, but when dealing with the actions of other nations, it’s best to consider things from their perspective. The score board reads clear to Iran:

Attacks on Iran - 2
Attacks by Iran (publicly) - 0
Wars started by Israel - 4
Wars won by Israel - 5

So, if you were faced with that kind of an opponent, maybe you wouldn’t be so far off the mark by declaring they’re dangerous. But the US’ strategic interests aren’t seen as being furthered by having a balance of WMD power in the Middle East, and so everybody outside the Arab world ignored this and bit their nails about the amount of centrifuges Iran has - which is, according to some sources, quite a bit.

No more than a day later, Israeli jets slashed through Syrian airspace to the Iranian border, dropped munitions and withdrew. The world journalistic community is still scratching its head as to what this meant. Some have theorized that it was to deter the Syrians from enhancing their WMD arsenal, particularly with nuclear assistance from North Korea, who was spotted delivering materials to them. The most likely explanation, however, is the most obvious: Israel was testing to see how a bombing run against Iran would work out.

“Of course Israel wants to let the Americans do that,” said Ephraim Inbar, director of the Begin-Sadat Center for Strategic Studies.

“But if we are left alone, the Israeli army is preparing to deal with the Iranian nuclear threat - if the political level allows it to - and this could have been a part of that.”

Nothing was done to quell the tensions surrounding this technical act of war. Instead, the rest of the West stepped to the fore to flex its might against Iran. France, which has a firm financial stake in Iran but which also has a fairly anti-Muslim leader, directly threatened force from its highest office if Iran didn’t demonstrate full compliance with international bodies in regulating its nuclear program. Sarkozy himself issued the statements, and they were more for the sake of the US and Israel than any Gallic agitation with Iran:

Sarkozy’s comments might well have been intended to alert Tehran that the leaders of US and Israel regard the so-called US-Iran nuclear standoff as an international problem that requires urgent solution.

Furthermore, US intelligence stated that Hizballah would likely launch an offensive against the US if Iran or its interests threatened. Mind you that this is the same group that the White House was, not long ago, immediately afraid of obtaining a nuclear device to use against us. And again, the significance of this isn’t the report itself, but the release of the report. In military diplomacy, statements are part of the arsenal. Specifically, they’re the trigger.

Iran mulled this over for awhile. France was the only one really keeping the rhetoric high, largely because Sarkozy wants to restore its military and diplomatic prestige. Then Iran issued a statement that, if Israel attacked it, it would respond with bombing.

“We have drawn up a plan to strike back at Israel with our bombers if this regime (Israel) makes a silly mistake,” Iran’s deputy air force commander, Gen. Mohammad Alavi, said in an interview with the semiofficial Fars news agency.

Trusting that the American public had forgotten about the Israeli jets breaking into Syrian airspace and bombing on Iran’s border - or simply did not care - the US issued a counter statement calling Iran’s comments “unprovoked” and “almost provocative”, “bellicose and hateful language“, and so forth. They also said, in the same breath, that the US is not taking military options off of the table when considering how to deal with Iran.

And, all across America, worried citizens came home from their 9-to-5, glanced at the one-minute spot about Iran’s latest bluster and the grim response from the US, and lost a bit more hair or sleep.

Things have only become more tense. Analysts are now talking about how Syria’s considering the Golan Heights to be a militarily viable target. More speculation about North Korean involvement in the region bubbles about. And the visit of Iran’s President to the UN in the near future has politicians here snarling. He’s even been called “Iran’s Hitler” - actually a bit of an apt analogy, but important in this context primarily due to the fact that Saddam was compared to Hitler as well.

Just today, Israel showed the world that it’s at the ready, scrambling its jets for the press to ponder about and the radars of its regional enemies to marvel at.

Further evidence that it’s going to be a hot time in Tehran this winter can be found at this excellent article: 10 Indications That The U.S. Is Planning Military Action Against Iran.

It’s hard not to think that Armageddon is just a news cycle away in the Middle East when you read news of Syria loading a chemical warhead onto a SCUD missile. And while there’re no assurances it’s not, I can at least note that it is very unlikely.

For instance, Israel has a tendency to neutralize threats against it very effectively before they materialize. They started four out of the five last wars, and technically won all five; a good batting average. They tend not to be inhibited by little things like international law. So if it came to the point where Syria wanted to turn Tel Aviv into a sarin sauna, Damascus’ assets would already be wreckage on the runway.

But most importantly, it’s just unlikely that things would go so far at all. And this is the aspect of WMD use that people so readily lose sight of: People need a very good reason to use them.

During the build-up to the Iraq War, fear over that rosy world-ender of a mushroom cloud was stoked to a fever pitch. The unreliability of rogue states seemed to have everyone biting their nails, as pundits were marched out to talk about the batty excesses and anecdotal barbarisms of leaders like Saddam. Instead of seeing things in terms of a horror movie script, people should have been trying to apply the rigors of their own minds to the situation. Logic defuses the fear of the WMD just as handily as it governs its use.

Foremost in the logical considerations is that having something doesn’t necessarily mean using it. Just because you own a firearm does not mean you are going to go on a shooting spree. Just because you own a pool doesn’t mean you swim daily, or even frequently. The US has an enormous nuclear stockpile, as does Russia. Neither state has used those assets, despite several bloody, protracted wars. And believe me, Russia’s war in Chechnya is hardly a pulled punch.

“Then what good are they if you never use them?” You might wonder. The answer comes with a bit more consideration. First off, they’re scary. No one wants to push a nation with that kind of firepower around too much; a WMD arsenal says, “If I’m going out, you’re all going out with me.” That means that they are a deterrent. How much of one?

Well, chemical and bio weapons are only so scary. They require extremely controlled circumstances to use effectively, as environmental factors tend to diffuse them. Imagine, if you will, trying to hit someone with smoke. Hard to aim, right? Even on a day without high winds, or rain, or any of the other things that foul up chem and bio weapons. Now try to hit more than 1,000 people. Even if you had a whole lot of gas, you’d still be working with a very random weapon. Consequently, our nation might’ve been terrified of Saddam’s supposed arsenal of WMD, but our military was sure that it could handle it by staying spread out and moving fast.

That leaves nukes. Nuclear weapons truly are terrifying. Popping off tons of sarin might inflict a few hundred casualties, maybe a few thousand, but that’s nothing compared to nukes. Their menace towards potential attackers is significant. And, after the Iraq War, they have taken on a much greater value.

The War was supposed to “show” rogue nations that they could not have WMD programs or they would be “held accountable” and attacked. Instead, it did the exact opposite. Just look at what happened: We attacked Saddam, who had a pathetic WMD program, but gave money and deals to North Korea and Libya, who have robust WMD programs that include nukes.

Now - let’s say you’re a “crazy dictator” of a bona fide US-approved “rogue state”. Listen to all the talk coming out of Washington and Main Street USA about how, post-9/11, America is all about bringing the whoop-ass to any potential threats. Then look at what happened to Saddam, and then at what happened to Kim Jong Il and Brother Khaddafi.

And tell me whether you can afford NOT to have a strong WMD program.

Therefore, the likelihood is that even “borderline” nations like Syria and Egypt will be drifting towards getting more and more powerful WMD. Yet we have to bear in mind that this does not mean they will use them. If anyone ever “wiped Israel off the map”, they would not be around long enough to establish the caliphate in al Quds - they would be vapor, courtesy of our nuclear arsenal. They know it, and so won’t use it. The only nation that poses a real WMD threat to us is the only nation that planned to “beat” us in a nuclear war, Russia. And they spent nearly half a century with this capability, yet did nothing.

So all the incentives are to have WMD and not use them. We can embargo and sanction and even run black ops to try to halt the build-up of WMD, but until we alter those incentives, it’s only slowing the inevitable.

Even after the ink was dry on his contract, Professor Erwin Chemerinsky’s offer to serve as dean for UC Irvine’s law school was withdrawn; a tragic loss to the reactionary suppression of speech by those who claim to love this country’s values more than their opponents. This is a miserable situation, not only because it is a matter of a person’s political opinions being so despised by a community as to inspire breach of professional obligation and silencing. It is particularly miserable given that Professor Chemerinsky embodies, for me and for many, the impassioned scholar who valued freedom of opinion above any personal cause.

Chemerinsky claims that UC-Irvine Chancellor Michael Drake, despite Drake’s public assertions, told him that pressure from conservative members of the board of regents led to the withdrawal of the position. I believe Erwin. I believe him because he has absolutely no fear of the truth, but that it might be compromised. For instance, later in a conversation with Larry Mantle on Air Talk, Chemerinsky did all he could to quash rumors or speculation as to which of the regents might have been involved, as he did not know.

That is the kind of exact, fair and empirical mind that fostered in me such appreciation of Erwin Chemerinsky when I had the pleasure of taking his Constitutional Law course as a political science student at USC. He was already notable - one could even say “notorious” - to me given his ardent activism for left wing causes of all stripe. Yet from the first class, Chemerinsky made it clear that the value of learning was not in the accumulation of knowledge but in the criticism of it. There were no safe opinions in his class; every position on matters like abortion, speech or gun control would be tested relentlessly. For me, this was the very soul of understanding - that we have to never found our beliefs on what is comfortable, but on what is right; have to accept a position, flaws and all, and prove its strength by fighting hard for it or abandon it and grow to embrace a better way.

His class was a pure ecosystem of intellectual Darwinism, and I will always enshrine it - as both an icon of good education and as a model of what to hold my own standards of belief to. As we were in USC, and many socially liberal attitudes were the typical fare, the Professor and I often ended up arguing against the rest of the class for the sake of conservative positions. But it was not the “Lear Jet Liberals” of USC that were to fatally influence Chemerinsky’s fate in this recent case - it was a different breed of millionaires: Orange County’s millionaires, the very embodiment of the chauvanistic thugs who claim to be the only pure champions of America but fume about “treason” the moment their lily-white illusion about this country is tarnished by an uncomfortable truth.

Ultimately, who fills the post of Dean is entirely the decision of UCI. One can only take so much umbrage with them declining Chemerinsky, even though it was particularly inept and offensive to offer the position past the point of contract before withdrawing it. All the same, it could not have happened to a worthier candidate. As conservative law professor Viet Dinh of Georgetown said:

“I disagree with Erwin on so many things, but with all the many panels and discussions I’ve had with him, I’ve never found him to be any other thing than a straight-up academic,” Dinh said. “I think he is one of the great scholars of our days.”

And he is great, not only because he has a first rate mind filled with an archive of knowledge. The difference between a good professor and a great professor always comes down to those that don’t suppress criticism but demand it. These are the people who truly seek to understand how our world works.

He would have been transformative for a community run by people who work very hard to escape that understanding.

War’s been on my mind of late; I’ve been thinking on it like one reflects on the personality of a close companion, enjoying a fascination not with the actions but with the soul behind them. That’s a side of war that few people consider. They know it superficially, through the images that cram the spaces between Britney-bashing and Insurance commercials. They know what it looks like, kind of, sounds like, kind of - they know War in the way its been sold.

As a consequence, that’s how they understand it. For most people, the fundamental principles of war are simple mechanical physics: If you are threatened, you hit the enemy, the enemy dies, all done. If this succeeds, war good; if it fails, war bad. They’re like ancient philosophers dividing the world into four elements, four humors, and cramming the complexity and sublime principles of the universe into their crude models.

It’s in interest of this defecit between understanding of war and interest in war that it came to me to write this. We are extolled every so often to “Remember 9/11″, and yet this statement demands more than just remembrance - it charges us to take actions to ensure such a thing never happens again. For those actions to work, though, they need to understand the rules they operate by. This aside will elucidate those rules.

War’s rules are rules of relations with other nations. For simplification’s sake, we’ll call the nations on hostile terms with us “the enemy”. But bear in mind, even the UK spies on us. There are no innocent nations in this world - the European nations buying under-the-table oil from Saddam were acting in their own interests, just as we act in our own interest by vetoing UN Resolutions condemning Israel’s human rights abuses, waging a terrorist war against the people of Nicaragua and then refusing to be held accountable by international law, and engaging in preferrential trade with China. Everybody is in it for themselves, and they all assume much the same of their fellow nations. My examination of the rules will explain why this is.

Now that we know who “the enemy” is, we need to identify three qualities of the enemy that may seem obvious, but actually don’t immediately come to mind. These three qualities are important because, after all, when you decide to interact with “the enemy”, you best know who you’re dealing with:

1. The enemy is as inherently proud as you are.
2. The enemy is as self-righteous as you are.
3. The enemy is as scared of you (or more so) than you are of them. (This is especially true when the US is concerned).

You might be thinking, “why does any of this matter?” I assure you it does, because war is not nearly so much an instrument of death as of domination. If the objective of war was to kill anyone who resisted, we could easily win, given our nuclear arsenal. However, this is not good economics, and it has the morality of the Mongol Horde, which people now consider to be unappealing. Given studies into the sources of PTSD, such as Lt. Col. Dave Grossman’s brilliant “On Killing“, it is also expensive in the damaged minds of the killers. Far more lucrative and psychologically inexpensive is to get along with everybody, albeit on your terms. That is the objective of war: Peace. And peace means getting others to get along with you - especially your enemies.

When we understand how to terrorize and persuade our enemies into being our friends, we’re understanding the workings of war. Understanding how to terrorize and persuade means understanding the psyche of other nations. Understanding the psyche of other nations comes down to understanding the fundamentals of that psyche we all share - my three points above. And once you establish that, you’re on your way to achieving the kind of successful course of relations that we saw in the mere century between the invasion and brutal occupation of our country by the British in the War of 1812 and our considering them staunchest allies in World War I.

I. The Enemy Is As Inherently Proud As You Are

This means, “The Enemy Thinks He’s The Best Too”. And it’s true. It is true and hard to grasp, and, in fact, it is true for the very reason that is hard to grasp - because people read that statement and think, “Well, how could the other guy think he’s the best when clearly /we’re/ the best nation?”

In the same way that people feel for their family more deeply than total strangers, the majority of the enemy population will have some deep love and pride in their nation. It may be a love-hate thing, but there will be love involved. If their government is not great, they’ll adore their culture. If the culture’s lacking, they’ll adore their history. Let’s face it - where you grow up forms the very framework of your values and your appreciations. Even if it sucks, you tend to cherish it in some sense.

What this amounts to for the purposes of war is that you always need to bear that in mind when dealing with the enemy. He will not gleefully accept an occupation of his country by a foreign power - even if you bring a better form of government. As a consequence, military planners usually shun wars of occupation. Consider the major wars of the last century, their objectives regarding occupation, and look at which were successful and which weren’t:

World War I was a drain and a loss for the occupier nations. Korea ended in successful restoration of pre-war borders. Vietnam was a war of occupation, arguably, since the South never really enjoyed the widespread support among its people that, say, South Korea did - it ended in a loss. Panama was a win without occupation. Gulf War I was a win without occupation. The Balkans were a win without occupation - the aggressor, Serbia, was not occupied; the UN occupied the areas endangered by Serbia, and so added to the defense of imperilled nations. The trend is clear. With one notable exception.

What happened with World War II?

World War II was most certainly an experiment in nation building warfare. However, the Allies were not the first scientists in the lab. We lose sight of the whole story of World War II here in America as we focus almost entirely on our role. As a consequence, we miss its most valuable lesson:

The lesson is that pre-emptive warfare and nation building are absolutely disastrous ventures when combined.

We were not the first nation builders and occupiers in World War II - Germany, Italy and Japan were. And before we stepped into the sand to do battle with them, they had already been in wasteful, bankrupting warfare for as much as a decade.

Japan had gone into Manchuria in 1932, and then had been committing hundreds of thousands of its lives and lethal amounts of its meager resources to fight China since 1936. It had done this because it felt it needed more regional influence, considering how unstable China was, and wanted to bring about the “East Asian Co-Prosperity Sphere”. Millions of its troops had already spent half a decade fighting a war that Japan had budgeted only a year or so of time and economy for, before they even decided to make a “Hail Mary” play for Pearl Harbor and the resource-rich colonies of the West. During that time, it had suffered horribly at the hands of insurgencies by native peoples it was “liberating” for its “co-prosperity sphere”, most famously the Vietnamese.

Italy had invaded Ethiopia in 1936 and had been fighting since. The Ethiopians simply would not give in to their occupiers, even though the Italians brought them railroads and let them say they were part of “The Empire” again. Not even the most widespread and successful use of chemical weapons could get the Ethiopians to settle down.

And Germany was the worst nation builder of all - the Germans seeing the world as just begging for their enlightened ways. The nations they occupied saw it differently. Hitler’s high command had told him before the invasion of Poland in September 1939 that they could sustain a military effort for about half a year, a year at the most. Things dragged out a bit longer. And in the course of them, Germany occupied Poland, France, Libya, Sicily, parts of Italy, and nearly a whole third of the U.S.S.R. In every situation, the Germans encouraged local governments to enjoy autonomy - I kid you not; they usually only cracked down when the pressure was really on. And in each case, the locals resisted with violence. It seemed like the more the Germans cracked down, the more violent the resistance became. Huh.

This brings us to the conclusion of our paragraphs on national pride, and to the question, “What to do?” Colonel Kurtz in ‘Apocalypse Now’ declares, after telling a story of NVA forces that hacked off the innoculated arms of children given medical aid by the Americans, “if I had ten divisions of those men under my command, our troubles here would be over very soon.” Is he right? Is uncompromised use of “The Horror” the way to overcome resistance from an occupied people? Can we ever know?

We are unfortunate in that an occupying army did a good job of trying to answer that question. The Germans were notoriously lax in governing the nations of the west, but gave no quarter to the Slavs. Legal loopholes in international law and sinisterly ambiguous policy created the butchery of the Holocaust, which was an aspect of a policy Germany’s leaders considered a counter-insurgency effort. As a whole, that effort of suppressing resistance through horror and murder surpassed even the already unfathomable toll on Europe’s Jews. Civilian deaths in the USSR were over 15 million. In Poland, 6 million. My Lai situations were not exceptions to the rule, but standard operating procedure, typically carried out by Russians that the Germans used as a “National Army”. In short, the Germans pulled few punches when it came to combatting insurgency. They still lost. The insurgency only grew due to their actions.

So how did we end up being successful - even uncontested - in our occupation of Germany and Japan?

A few things contributed to this, but the bottom line was that we made people feel more secure under our leadership than under theirs. First, we were no longer bombing them - always a plus. More importantly, we kept the constabulary intact, ensuring law and order. We had enormous occupying forces - about one Allied soldier for every four Germans in the case of Germany, compared to, say, one soldier for every hundred in Iraq. And most significantly of all, these were nations that were told by their highest authorities to give up - after over a decade of war.

Every measure to sustain pride was accounted for. In Germany, provincial governments were a top priority. In Japan, MacArthur brilliantly preserved the Emperor and had him play a part in legitimizing the occupation.

The lesson to all this? Avoid wars of occupation. If you must fight one, be absolutely, positively, beyond all contingencies, sure that you enhance, not decrease, the people’s pride and security.

Otherwise, like the Russians who the Germans liberated from the yoke of murderous Stalin, they will fight to the end.

2. The Enemy Is As Self-Righteous As You Are

How many times have you heard it said that “our cause is just”? This statement is designed to evoke in the mind of the listener the many great things they hope to achieve through their murderous and horrible deeds, and to banish the value of the deeds themself. If one asked the American people, “Do you want to drop explosives on another country that have a one-in-four chance of blowing up an unsuspecting civilian, and an almost certain chance of killing someone’s son, daughter, husband, wife, father or mother?” they would not find many takers. If you asked them, “do you want to be safer?” or “do you want to free other people from tyranny?”, they will perk right up.

The interesting aspect of this different definition of the same question is that one is an accurate definition, the other is not - it’s only an aspiration. When we go to war, it /is/ almost certain we will kill someone, including civilians. It is not certain, however, that it will make us safer or spread good ideals. And yet nations go to war for the ideals, not for the practicality, at least openly. This is a fine thing to recognize in ourselves, but what does it mean for our interests when it comes to how the enemy sees things?

What it means is that the enemy, like us, is less sympathetic to our pain and more sympathetic to the pain of those like him. And pain, as 9/11 reminds us, is a powerful motivating factor.

9/11 unified us against our attackers, in will if not necessarily in policy. It filled us with a fierce determination to gain retribution, one that disregarded old rules of international relations - like no aggressive warfare - as antiquated. It was, in our opinion, one of the greatest human tragedies of our history.

Yet what was it to al-Qaeda? To al-Qaeda, it was justified collateral damage. And to al-Qaeda and much of the Arab world, who are on the receiving end of our missiles, it was just a fraction of the fear, humiliation and agony that they have suffered.

Logically, they are right. Taking just the first Gulf War as an example, a conservative estimate of civilian casualties due to Coalition forces bombing is 3,500, roughly equivalent to the attacks on us. Civilian deaths in the current war exceed 100,000 - over 33 9/11s. And yet the response from most Americans is, “Well, that’s really too bad, but we have a mission.” That mission is an ideal, like freedom or safety - not reality - though those deaths are real. We essentially shrug our shoulders and continue on, as we did with Vietnam (53+ 9/11s) and World War II (266+ 9/11s).

Our mission, we feel, is too important for total empathy. But the enemy often sees things the same way. Just as we can claim freedom and prosperity as the ideal outcomes of our policy, al-Qaeda can claim freedom for oppressed people and salvation in heaven - pretty important stuff, morally speaking. Both sides use their causes to justify massive collateral damage.

And yet, we still sting at 9/11 - just about every American mourns it on a visceral level. And it is important to note that, similarly, the enemy does. Whether in Iraq’s crossfire or Palestine under US-supplied Israeli missiles, civilians take it very, very seriously when we blow them up. They don’t care for our ideals any more than we care that Osama wants to get us all to convert and be serviced by virgins in paradise, or that he feels deeply for the plight of Palestinians.

So one combatant’s collateral damage is another combatant’s undying cause to fight on. What does this mean for strategy?

It means that, when fighting a war, one should keep one’s ideals as close as possible to one’s actions. Whatever you say you are going to do is what you should do. This makes you look rational, and makes it easy for the enemy to understand what’s going on as you harm them. Consider it the International Relations equivalent of “don’t make empty threats to your kids, and explain with honesty and consistency what they’re being punished for.”

If you drop bombs to destroy a dictator’s army, and kill children in the process, the victims can at least understand why it happened in real terms. If you kill children for freedom, it tends not to pan out so well on the receiving end.

This also makes things easier for your generals. Planning for “bringing hope and justice” to another nation is a tall order. Planning for the simple, distinct objective of, “Secure the capital, kill the rebels”, is easier.

Most importantly, it pertains to the perspective we must have on the value of peace. We would expect our enemies to simply swallow the fierce, personal agony of all that human damage we inflicted on them, and accept our will and our promises of peace. And we, the nation changed by but one 9/11, will be required to accept our enemy’s promises of peace in kind.

3. The Enemy Is As Afraid Of You As You Are Of Them (Or Even More So!)

Have you ever been told, when in a pique of anger, “if you could just see yourself now!”? Often we lose sight of the presence we present to others, especially when it comes to negative emotions. Snide comments, yelling, coarse language - they all matter, but not nearly so much to us as to the people who receive them.

The same holds true for the relations between countries - we often do not see the negative aspects we present for what they are, and military action is the classic example. Whenever we read articles about a new fighter jet or brigades of troops, we feel a bit safer, or at least unconcerned. But if we read about, say, Iran or even an ally like Turkey designing the same, it’s a cause for concern.

So who’s right? Should we be worried about Iran? Well, it comes down to whether they should be worried about us. After all, the reason why the notion of new weapons for our side doesn’t bother us is because we’re pretty confident that they will be used for our interests. If we thought the US developing a new UAV meant that we would be drawn into an endless, exhausting war that would end in our defeat, we might be a bit more concerned. And it is that consideration - not actual force - that keeps the world so intact.

There’s an old adage that, paraphrased, says “wars are started because the people that start them believe they’ll win”. This is absolutely true. No nation is suicidal. Most wars are won before they’re even fought by something called “deterrence”, which is the principle of being so big and bad-ass that your enemies will not even try to fight with you because the odds are they will lose. The US has deterrence in spades.

But deterrence only goes so far. If you’re the big kid on the playground, you can be fair and see that everyone’s included, or you can be a bully. If you’re a bully, and push other kids around whenever you want, you incite your rivals to attack you and you lose the support of other kids on the playground that only back you because they don’t want to get beat up. For a long time, the globe’s wars were fought between single nations or small coalitions of nations - the bullies - who scrabbled their way to the top with military prowess and then fought off rivals until being dragged down. After this very system exploded across the globe in an unparalleled paroxysm of human agony - World War II - the world sought a solution to increase deterrence while decreasing the cost of military investment. That solution is the United Nations.

The UN doesn’t always work very fast, but the backbone of it is that aggressive warfare - meaning, attacking another country - is illegal. The only time that it is legal is when the UN agrees that all options have been exhausted, the threat is imminent, and that everyone has to chip in. Therefore, when circumstances extreme enough to mobilize the entire world - or in the event of an attack by one nation on another - occurs, the entire world shares the expense of restoring peace. Is that enough for deterrence?

Not really. In most cases, nations still need to get together regional coalitions. But the way the UN does work is that it discourages untenable aggressive warfare. In essence, it is a good barometer of what military ventures are realistic and which are too risky. If the UN frowns on a mission, it will not be an easy thing. If the UN /and/ NATO fail to participate, the proposal they avoid should be considered a pipe dream.

In that way, we defend ourselves against other nations. This is why Argentina is not in an arms race with the US. It knows aggressive war is illegal, and thus need not build up to fight the US. So long as it does not oppose the UN’s leadership - namely, the USA - too vehemently and does not get into any aggressive wars, it needn’t worry about international defense and other nations need not worry about it. Yet what about those nations that do oppose us? Aren’t they too crazy to trust and, like Old Yeller gone rabid, have to be put down?

Again, no. Not long ago, we considered just about everyone as dangerous as Iran. But the reason that, back then, France was more concerned about being in an arms race with Britain than with South Africa was because of that adage we mentioned earlier about winning wars. The Great Powers didn’t worry about the little nations because they knew that the little nations could never fatally harm them, whereas they could crush the tiny nation. Consequently, they worried about the people who were absolute threats to them. Somehow, in the post Cold War world, we lost sight of this:

Namely, the reason why Saddam or Ahmadinajad are no threat to the US is because we and the rest of the world would turn them into endless smoking glass if they struck us. Consider how scary we are - we suffered a single attack and responded by toppling an entire country circumstantially connected to it. That’s pretty potent. An actual attack by another country would bring far, far worse for that country. And even tin-pot, self-obsessed dictators like Kim Jong Il and Ahmadinajad don’t want to invite that. Especially those kinds of leaders, in fact, since the only thing they really have going for themselves is the prospect of personal profit at their country’s expense. Why blow that by getting your country annihilated?

On the other hand, they don’t want to seem too much like lambs. They know we’d rather see them gone from the face of the earth, so having a few nukes up their sleeve in case of emergencies is about the best they can do - it’s not like they can count on the UN, after all; look where that got Saddam in ‘90.

So, just like we are not raring to go after China any time soon, even “rogue nations” aren’t keen on coming after us. Thanks to the UN and its outlawing aggressive war, they’re not keen on going after other nations either - again, witness the transformation of Iraq from 1990 to 1991, courtesy of some very impressive international cooperation. Libya, for instance, is ruled by an actual, certified madman who has more ties to global terror than Cobra Commander on G.I.Joe did, and it has more WMDs than it knows what to do with. And yet, you don’t hear about the urgent threat of Libya. Why? Deterrence.

The lesson? A successful military strategy takes into account that threat of violence is far more powerful in dominating other countries and preserving peace than actual violence. If the world is one where countries attack when threatened, everyone feels threatened and arms accordingly. If the world is one where countries attack at extreme, almost sure risk of being entirely annihilated, everyone feels like the thing to do is play along.

The military knows this. Our strategic assessments of ourselves rightly shine with how strategically terrifying we are. Rising powers like Russia and China are a concern, but mostly the US knows its on top. That leaves terrorists - “non-state actors” - as a principal concern.

The Post-9/11 World’s Greatest Weapon

The greatest weapon the United States faces is not a WMD. It is fear.

This is becoming a trope of the times, but bear with me a moment longer as our assessment of the enemy’s psyche comes to a close. With fear, the enemy can make us act irrationally. The enemy can make us feel threatened when we are not, can make us shun our friends as false friends and take up causes that we never would have considered had we looked at them calmly.

And this, my friends, is just what the terrorists want.

The reason why is because they have little resources, we have many. We have international laws, vast economic power and the goodwill of the world. They have nothing but commitment and vision born of desperation. So they needed some way of using what they had to get us to waste what we had.

So they scared us. Badly. And the people looked to the leadership for answers, as people do in times of fear.

And the leadership played right into the terrorist’s hands. They broke international laws, have poured all of our vast economic power down a seemingly bottomless conflict against an enemy not even 1/1000th the size of the USSR or Imperial Japan, or even the NVA, and lost us our allies in the process. This is just what al-Qaeda wanted. It knew it was tiny, but figured we would lose sight of those three lesson we reviewed here - just as the Soviet did in Afghanistan - and that, like with the Soviet, it would prevail.

These lessons are important to keep in mind on the anniversary of 9/11, as a long road against global terror stretches ahead.

“Which is more important,” I hear a Senator brusquely demand of Ambassador Crocker. “al-Qaeda’s safe haven in Pakistan or al-Qaeda in Iraq?”

This is how I logged in to the report of General Petraeus and Ambassador Crocker to the Senate, and the tenor was as clear as hail on a fiberglass roof. The Representatives would be sweethearts by comparison; the Senate was swinging hard.

To transcribe the comments will be difficult, as it’s not “Question and Answer” so much as “Accusation and Attack”. After Crocker and Petraeus got dragged over the coals for not declaring their front was more or less important than Pakistan - imagine that; they wouldn’t sell out the importance of their mission, the one they’d come to discuss - the Senator followed by furiously asserting that more American troops were dying than ever. This isn’t true. Deaths dropped sharply around mid-June, to a level unseen since the sectarian violence flared hard last awful summer. To not recognize the significance of that trend is as much an ideological distortion as the Democrats accuse the Administration of.

The follow-up question from the next Senator was about reorganizing forces in Iraq for greater efficiency. Petraeus gave examples that suggest a steady improvement, but not a hasty one, and not one without peril. This is satisfactory, both to the
Senator and me, as I got to hear about battalion replacement rates. This is the kind of thing that matters from the report of a theatre commander - not slanted soapbox screaming and musing on grand strategy.

My own Senator Boxer of California is next, and goes into another lengthy preamble. Very lengthy. This is another hallmark of the Senate - they are even more long-winded in the build-up to their query than the Representative. One significant point she makes in her account of the disastrous path from 9/11 to where we are now is that we had the good will of the whole world and lost it. This is good to bear in mind as we view the eyes of the globe upon us. But it’s not her point, and she beats a circuitous course through the usual sour terms about the war - Army of Occupation; Iraqis don’t want us there; you painted a rosy picture. She at last admits that she really has no question.

And this is the point of this hearing: Not the guarded hope that something in the report could effect the course of the war for good or ill, for greater military commitment or withdrawal or change of strategy. Not even the cynical shrug that it is just a matter of decorum. This hearing is so that Petraeus can draw the cameras and the Senators can preen and speechify for them. This is government as deranged as any work by Burroughs or Carroll’s nightmarish imaginations: not the grinding, dehumanizing machinery of a Camus court, but the sacrifice of substance for image, progress for perception, hope for hype.

Boxer skids to a halt and then admits she’s just plumb out of time for any actual question, let alone for an answer from Crocker or Petraeus. All the while, Joe Biden is making note how imperative it is that the answers from the Ambassador and General be kept short. Absurdism climbs like mercury in mid-July Baghdad - the posturing is eating up all the time, but the rules say the answers have to be kept short; so short they don’t even have time for questions to go with them.

More questions are asked. I’ve now come to assume that this means Republican Senators are getting a chance to speak. But then Senator Nelson, D-Fla, does what Florida’s known for - something weird. His weirdness is asking concise (weblog friendly) questions and getting the same in reply. My hope for this hearing scrapes itself off of the floor.

Nelson asks if reconciliation is necessary to peace. Crocker says it is. Good so far.

Nelson asks if Anbar worked because of its ethnic homogeneity. Crocker says that, yes, in part, that helped a lot, but that reconciliation and Anbar’s real, substantial improvement comes from establishing good relations between it and the Federal government in Baghdad, and that’s building up.

Nelson really goes for the marrow by asking why on earth Iran would be an honest broker, and not take advantage of Iraq. Crocker says that it very well might, and in fact is, but that diplomacy shouldn’t be abandoned, but seen through to the fullest.

Nelson then inquires directly as to Iran’s activities - potential or present. Crocker states clearly that Iran’s in this up to their elbows, training and arming militias, and that something’s got to be done.

All the bases are covered to establish the basic stakes and chain of cause and effect. On one hand, I’m pleased, since these questions were on topic and their answers important. On the other, you could discover as much from a single column of the NYT.
If it takes the Senate nearly a dozen questioners and over an hour to get to this point, there’s not much to wave a pennant about.

Biden seems less than enthused too, and calls a break. After a charming shout-out to someone in uniform, of course.

More to come. Whether we care for it or not.

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As they return, a Senator asks a rather brilliant question. She inquires as to whether the troop reductions that Petraeus projects are dependent on the projected readiness of the Iraqi Armed Forces. Given that the development of those forces has been unreliable in the past, this is extremely important - is this another situation where we’re being told, “they’ll stand up; we’ll stand down”, while we have no means to stand them up and keep them up?

Petraeus expresses that the reliance is shifting from the Iraqi armed forces to local, provincial forces - namely the paramilitary groups, the insurgents who’ve turned against al-Qaeda, and the police forces being built up on the provincial level. This is not a sureshot solution, but it is better than putting all of our chips on Baghdad’s soldiery, which is one of the many reasons I’ve backed it and Petraeus. That he identifies this as a key part of the strategy is a heartening change of tune.

The next question from her is how Iraqi civilians might be protected and might protect themselves. Petraeus declares this a priority.

Then Obama takes the stand.

If I could quote him word for word, I would. Later, I will. He establishes the stipulation that the military’s performance is not in question - it is superb. He also notes that when elements of strategy, not tactics - meaning, the long-term, large-scale effects of military action as opposed to the techniques of that action - are put to Petraeus and Crocker, they have “punted a bit”, noting that it is outside their balliwick.

He then says that, strategically, considering what’s at stake - and he enummerates what disastrous consequences the war has had, and what it might lead to - they are going to be asked about some questions on the cusp of strategy. They are generals, after all. And Petraeus is told that his command of strategy is what Anbar can be attributed to; not the Surge. And considering the extraordinary expense of the Surge, in Obama’s opinion, the return was minor. In essence, Obama’s saying that the politics have worked great, but the military solutions continue to be grueling, brutal and expensive. So, given that, what possible scenario would encourage reduction of the troops?

Thing is, he took too long. Crocker basically replies by saying that reconciliation’s the goal and politics the means, and then things have to be closed down for another Senator - this one a Republican - to go on for another six minutes about how we have to “honor the fallen” by sending more lives into harm’s way. He at last asks about what needs to be done regionally, inspiring Crocker to mention how surrounding nations need to do more to aid Iraq, particularly Syria, which is leaking in foreign fighters.

Petraeus steps in to talk about Iran’s activities, noting some of what he did yesterday: He asserts that Iran trains, equips and directs numerous militias in Iraq, placing Special Forces troops in country to assist in that effort. Again he mentions this shadowy “Lebanese Department 2800″, organized to facilitate Iran’s infiltration of the country.

Senator Menendez, the Democrat who follows, decides he’s going to score some anti-war swagger points by asking Petraeus clipped questions and then talking over his answers. Petraeus doesn’t take bait, and continues talking as if he wasn’t being interrupted. The result is that it’s Menendez, not him, who trips up.

Menendez tries to look smart by implying that the strategy doesn’t change, the numbers aren’t changed and that we’re fighting and dying so that Iraqi politicians can argue endlessly over power sharing. Well, sorry, Menendez; 33% isn’t a passing grade in my book. Petraeus might point out that the strategy has substantially changed - our main enemy is no longer Nationalist Sunni militias; our outreach to local forces is properly prioritized; we’re almost adequately armed rather than disastrously underarmed - but Petraeus can’t get a word in edgewise. He’s merely relentlessly browbeaten.

The next Senator talks about how it was because of the UN we went in - yeah, /right/ - and that it’s been all about providing for the Iraqis since. He talks about the course of the establishment of a government as if it was the same thing as the course of the war, citing the Iraqi Constitution and elections as definite signs of some kind of linear progress. “We’re at the third goal”, he says.

It’s at this point that I become entirely dismayed, even irked, at these proceedings. Biden, a guy I respect, is having to oversee this kangaroo court of a hearing and is chastizing - God knows why; rules of Senatorial decorum? - the people who are lucky to even get a chance to answer for taking too long. Obama is tossing stump speeches. Everyone else is just there for bloodsports - delivering statements like a boxer jabbing to soften up his opponent, quick and intense, then a sweep of rhetoric; damn the facts, to heck with listening, just keep your mouth moving as if you could lift the polls by hot air alone.

And, sadly, you probably can. People don’t care to learn so much as they want to hear their feelings expressed:

Feel patriotic but a little confused? A Republican Senator will assure you all this violence is for altruism’s sake, and only doubt can doom us - things couldn’t be better, but for those liberal lies and defamy.

Feel scared and kind of guilty about inflicting untold agony? A Democrat will screech about the lies of the Administration so loud and quick that your head will be spinning too fast to even see what’ll happen when we leave Iraq to fall into the abyss this war’s put it on the brink of.

This goes beyond apathy. It’s the politics of the mob. Perhaps this is the way it has always been.

But it seems a damn sorry way to run a war.

General Petraeus’ Report hearing has begun. So far, if this was a TV script, the writer would be severely criticized for being too predictable. Then again, as I noted in an entry this past Friday, the drama in this is likely all going to be scripted - Petraeus probably won’t be revealing anything worthy of a “gasp” moment, and already outlined the situation with characteristic candor and insight in his letter to the troops.

On cue, a few Code Pink protesters said something unintelligible and strident, and were promptly removed. So far, so metaphoric. No doubt it’s going to be a day for allegory and irony. My kind of day.

Then the Chairman of the House Armed Services Committee, Ike Skelton, had some words. Most talked about how the Administration’s predictions haven’t been credible, how the Maliki government is unreliable, and how Petraeus’ foresight and strategy has been superb - if only it had been taken seriously years ago. The usual accolades were showered on him and the troops by Skelton and by Lantos.

One wouldn’t know it from Duncan Hunter and Ros-Lehtinen’s comments - two Republicans. They talked of how criticisms of the General’s credibility by the Left are just shameful, and asked for every Democrat to apologize for the ad MoveOn.org put out that called Petraeus “General Betray Us”. They then equated 9/11 to Pearl Harbor and called this effort “the new Greatest Generation”. Right there, their credibility takes a nose dive. Yes, there’s a “War on Terror” on, but it has about as much similarity to World War II as the War on Drugs has to Medicare.

So now that the Democrats established themselves as biased and the Republicans as diversionary and deranged, we move on. More protesters - some black-shirted veterans against the war. They said, “Tell the truth, General” and got hauled away.

This early period ended with a note of yet more allegorical irony as it was discovered that Petraeus’ microphone, and Crocker’s, is not working.

After a break, Petraeus will begin talking. We’ll update following that.

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Petraeus begins by talking about how local support and increased troop activity - “kinetic” he calls it, and that’s a very appropriate term - is making substantial security gains. He whips out a chart.

Monthly attacks in the show pony, Anbar, have gone from 1,300 to 200 or so. He also mentions that, since December, ethno-sectarian killings have dropped by 80% in Baghdad. IEDs are down. Suicide bombings and car bombings have gone from 175 in March to 90.

Thing is, he’s talking about al-Qaeda and the Sunni kinds of violence. Suicide bombings are the fare of the foaming shaheed al-Qaeda sends in, not the Iranian thugs or Shi’a militias. IEDs are down, it’s true, but roadside bombings using Iranian built explosively formed penetrators are up.

He then talks to how the Iraqi security forces are growing, with 140 in the fight and some 90 being self-sufficient. He says this is in spite of a dearth of COs and NCOs and sectarian influence. However, that’s a false indicator. As proud as Petraeus can be about getting a viable Army intact, more forces “in spite of” sectarian influence just means more traitors who’re more effective within the ranks of the police.

Along that same disturbing point, Petraeus talks about how Iraq is one of the biggest customers of American arms, spending $1.6 billion annually on them. Let’s hope that they’re only selling tasers and gym whistles to anybody in the Interior Ministry.

Then we had a flash of Petraeus genius - a special section of his report emphasizing the critical nature for a comprehensive cyber-space offensive against al-Qaeda. And this is where he’s aiming for the aorta of al-Qaeda - terrorists are a recyclable resource, born of outrage, and victory comes down to crushing their information assets more than their physical forces. This is a War on Anger more than it is a War on Terror, and Petraeus knows that in such a fight the message is a better weapon than a missile.

This is where he stands to overcome expectations that his report will have no effect on the postures of our legislature’s political parties. He speaks to the interests of both sides, both parties, and explains why they have merit.

Petraeus understands the situation, and he conveys this by recognizing that neither party’s opinions are made of whole cloth - both have facts behind them. The facts encourage a reduction. They also demand determination and endurance for the short term. These are keys to defeating al-Qaeda. But more than anything, the facts require a new direction.

Petraeus has talked about the new need to employ technological capabilities like UAVs, IED-proof APCs and cyberspace, and that’s how he’s encouraging new direction. However, that’s a change in operational direction, not strategic, and the problems are largely strategic - “political” as the favored parlance goes. Cyberspace touches on it, especially so far as the larger War on Terror is concerned, but it doesn’t touch Iraq’s principal dilemma for America’s interests: Iran and the sectarian, venal Shi’a domination of Iraq’s government - the very government we’re supposedly there to defend.

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Code Pink goes code red right after the General’s done, and have to be dragged out, literally kicking and screaming. Nothing like pitching a tantrum to bring credibility to your message. Call me old fashioned, but I’ve never quite cottoned to this polite new breed of protest - “complaint by installment”. Storm a hearing en masse and chain yourself to Republicans, and you’ll raise some real newsprint. Speak up only when Robert’s Rules of Order has ordained a pause in proceedings and you end up a fussy footnote.

Huey Newton rolls in his grave.

Behold the fate of sourpuss soccer mom protesters. Note the distinct lack of tear gas.

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Crocker comes on board and talks about how things are, despite most a lack of legislation, financial aid implementation or infrastructure repair in underserved areas, things are actually looking up.

He speaks proudly about the democracy in Iraq. I can’t nod along. The democratic system led to the election of the Dawah Party, the political paralysis of minority communities and an ad hoc dictatorship. The purple fingers are losing their luster. 2009 can’t come fast enough for everybody but the thugs in power, I assure you.

Yes, Crocker goes on at length at talking about how seriously the Iraqi legislators are taking the nurturing of their fledgling democracy, with “a deep sense of commitment and patriotism”. As an example, he speaks, after some portentous preamble, about how the ruling coalition - minus the Sunnis - took a big step in resolving to talk about drafting reconciliation legislation. Call me cynical, but if the Republicans announced that they would exclude the Democrats and were now determined to meet at some point to talk about what they might draft that might be passed and might be funded to implement universal health care, most people would not take it very seriously.

Then he says something that actually sends one of my eyebrows up. Muqtada al-Sadr is shuffling away from extremism…

Al-Sadr most certainly did issue an order freezing attacks on Coalition troops and fellow Shia after the pilgrims to Karbala were assaulted. I had assumed this was due to the reduction of British troops from the Shia bastion of Basra that had sparked a spasm of inter-Shia turf warring. In any event, it is true that al-Sadr has called for the Shia extremists to not be so darn extreme for a little while.

Apparently Iran missed the memo, as we’re continuing to lose troops to roadside bombs. As I thought at the time he issued the order, al-Sadr may stand to lose, not consolidate power, by issuing the order to stay violence and see to reorganization. He’s more an opportunist, taking advantage of the extremism and outrage, than he is the captain of it. This was borne out by his steep drop in power when he tried to join the government two years ago. I would expect that Sadr gets marginalized by his “consolidation”, as Iran seeks more reliable and “kinetic” clients to perpetrate their military agenda.

Crocker goes on about how governments abroad are gradually moving closer to Iraq. They, at least, are taking advantage of the settling of violence in the capital brought about by the Security Plan aspect of the Surge. But when he talks about how the Iraqis have been “given time to reflect what kind of government they want”, I’m not thinking “reflect” is what has been going on. Nevertheless, he is right that the stakes are Iranian conquest of the country if we pull out precipitously.

Only thing is, we need to be sure we’re fighting that conquest, not facilitating it. Right now, we’re just not racking up any of the right numbers that would indicate that, and seeing plenty of the wrong.

And speaking of wrong numbers, Crocker talks about organizing an international fund that would assist the Iraqis in considering how to budget for infrastructure rebuilding. That’s fine, but again, off topic. The point nowadays is not that they’re not getting enough money. It’s that the money’s not being spent, or is vanishing. Not accounting, but accountability, is the issue.

And speaking of accountability, it is time for the Q&A…

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Skelton starts off by saying that the Iraqi parliamentarians have been sitting on their thumbs. He asks why, given no progress in nearly two years, we should expect anything’s going to be different. In essence, “why should we take it that they’re serious about this whole ‘Democratic progress’ thing?”

Crocker says that everybody’s frustrated, but that the resolution of the ruling coalition to at some point talk about how they might draft reconciliation legislation back on the 26th shows they’re serious. And that’s it for evidence. He goes on to reassure that the Iraqis are indeed serious.

You work with what you have.

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Next is Lantos, who is saying, “Petraeus, you think we should withdraw slower than other military commanders - who are not serving as commanders in Iraq. Why should we believe you?”

Petraeus cuts off the spirit of the question most riki tiki - he notes that the withdrawal he suggests for the next year will be quite substantial. He specifically states that Iran’s the reason we need to stick in there in a more serious way than - in Lantos’ words - “responsible military leaders”, active and retired, have noted we might. Lantos is asked which reports, and can’t cite anybody but Admiral Fallon, who Petraeus knows and says supports him.

He really doesn’t know what Lantos is talking about and, it seems, neither does Lantos. Someone needs a new assistant, or to remember to get printer toner before they go to the most significant hearing of the year so that they can print out reports.

Lantos isn’t done yet, though.

He notes that the current Administration would not be so keen on engaging in diplomacy with certain unsavory countries. He notes North Korea and Libya as cases where legislative pressure has compelled the White House to talk with them; that we would not “be as far down the road” with them were that not the case.

Considering that Libya is making huge bank off of freer trade with the West despite no change in their human rights record or ties to terrorism, and that North Korea’s having their way with us in terms of its nuclear program, I am not thinking Lantos should want the credit to fall to Congress. Furthermore, I don’t think it has to do with the legislature at all, as, well, there’s been no legislation to this effect.

But the question leads to, “will we talk with Iran?”

Crocker gives a lengthy “yes”, along with the caveat that the Iranians have done jack-nothing but string us along with diplomacy. They have sworn up and down that they want a stable Iraq, but say that there can’t be a stable Iraq with us in the country, and then prove their point by using the Police we trained to blow us up. Crocker sounds a bit pessimistic about Iranian diplomacy. Right there with you, Ambassador.

Lantos follows by noting that Maliki has said that he has “other friends in the region” if the US leaves - namely Iran. He asks if Crocker recognizes this and considers it a threat.

Crocker talks of all the nice things Maliki has said about the US and about how important we are to stability there. He then notes that Maliki criticized the wild violence that seriously screwed up the pilgrimage of his fellow Shia to Karbala. Lastly, the PM doesn’t speak Farsi. Crocker notes that a lot of people think that just because Iran’s Shia and Maliki is a Shia, it doesn’t mean they’re in cahoots - after all, remember the Iran-Iraq War?

This is true. But that Maliki is a long-time member and leader of the party that brought the Islamists to power in Iran in 1979, defeating the secular revolution there, is more evidence that they’re in cahoots. That and the Iranian bombs in the Ministry of the Interior his party controls that are blowing us up, and his personal efforts to mask such abuses and corruption from oversight.

And Ambassador, I do remember the Iran-Iraq War. It was started by Saddam, and seriously galvanized opposition by the Shia and Kurds against his government. I doubt Maliki celebrates it.

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Duncan Hunter asks about what improvements in the Iraqi Army might be cited.

Petraeus says that more Sunni are signing up, and that the Army’s doing pretty good. Small elements in the force need to be “dealt with” due to sectarian influence in their ranks. This is, indeed, what most reports indicate. He notes that it’s a bit of problem to find officers, but that more are being trained and that a few former Army are being called to duty.

Hunter asks if Iran’s sending more equipment and troops in.

Petraeus’ answer, in short: “Yes indeed.”

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Ileana Ros-Lehtinen speaks next, and, after yet another request that the Democrats all apologize for the MoveOn.org ad, asks what will happen if we withdraw troops too soon from Iraq. She goes on at length about how unstable and shiftless Syria and Iran are, and the tendency of Arabs to blame Israel for the ills of the region.

I’m not quite sure where she’s going with this. And I’m not sure if Petraeus tries to answer.

Petraeus responds by saying that shifting the policing of Iraq’s municipalities from a national force to local forces has calmed things appreciably. This has allowed the national forces to interdict the flow of bullets and bully-boys from other countries. That is true, and yet, only addresses the aspect of her question that pertained to other nations having a hand in Iraq’s fate - not about the consequences of a premature reduction, not about Israel or the Arab street’s opinions thereof, and not about MoveOn.org. This is all for the best, I think. Yet I would like to know if he would apply or dispel the specter of The Killing Fields.

Now comes the long awaited break.

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I return to find Ackerman, a Democrat, exploding in a very arcane way about how Iraq’s not really part of the global war on terror, because if it is, we’d stay and kill every terrorist.

That’s insane on a number of levels. Petraeus seemed genuinely confused, but persisted in saying that wiping out al-Qaeda is both reasonable and key, whereas tamping down sectarian violence is another matter.

_________________________________________________

Now Burton, a Republican, asks a similarly slanted question - “would leaving Iraq early be a success or a failure in the war on terror?”

Simply by qualifying it as “early” kind of determines, by simple logic, what the answer is. Petraeus answers objectively by saying that allowing Iraq to be so unstable as to be a haven for al-Qaeda would, indeed, be a bad thing in the war on terror, but as far as asset management on a global scale, that’s not his fortee. If you need info on hunting Osama, go to the Special Forces.

More on al-Qaeda from Petraeus, talking about how it’s the “wolf closest to the sled”. They’re losing sanctuaries and strength, but they’re working to reconstitute. Putting emphasis and due pressure on them is the way to go, Petraeus says, and that’s true. He then nails the truth by saying that the long-term threat is Iran. Long-term and short-term in my opinion, as Iran’s attacks on us are now the majority of our losses. He goes on to note that the capture of the Lebanese Hizballah 2800 and an Iranian Special